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MORE THAN A WOMAN:  INSIGHTS INTO CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FRENCH SEX QUOTA
DARREN ROSENBLUM*
DARIA ROITHMAYR**k
ABSTRACT
In 2011, France enacted a Corporate Board Quota to establish a forty percent
floor for either sex on corporate boards.  Existing literature presumes that women
will change the way firms function and that their presence in upper management
will improve both governance and financial returns.  To assess the potential
impact of the quota, we interviewed twenty-four current and former corporate
board members.  Our analysis of these interviews generates two findings.  First,
our results indicate that, at least in the view of board members, the sex quota has
had an impact on the process of board decision-making, but adding women has
not affected the substance of decision-making.  Second, our findings suggest for
the first time that adding women to a board may well have a substantive impact
on decision-making, not because the newly added members are women but rather
because they are more likely to be outsiders.  French participants reported that
newly added female members affected substantive decision-making because they
were more likely to be foreign, to be expert in a wider range of areas, and to be
drawn from non-elite networks than their male counterparts. 
INTRODUCTION
In early 2011, France adopted a law that requires men and women each have
at least forty percent representation on corporate boards.1  This quota compels
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1. Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des
hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et à l'égalité professionnelle [Law
2011-103 of January 27, 2011, on the Balanced Representation of Women and Men on Board of
Directors and Supervisory Boards and Equality Professional], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011 [hereinafter J.O.].
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mixité (roughly translated to mean sex diversity)2 for over two thousand publicly
traded companies in France.
France is the largest country to have adopted such a quota, but by no means
is it the first.3  Norway adopted a quota in 2003 requiring a floor of forty percent
for either sex resulting in universal compliance in 2008.4  Since France’s
adoption, several other European countries have followed suit, including most
notably Germany.5  Likewise, the European Union is currently debating whether
to adopt a quota.6  Even in the United States, where libertarian notions of
property and resistance to affirmative action have undermined any interest in
quotas,7 the European move has triggered a debate over the need for greater sex
diversity in upper management.
This project constitutes a preliminary study to investigate whether and how
the French quota has affected corporate governance in CAC-40 firms, France’s
largest firms.8  We interviewed twenty-four members of these firms’
2. Mixité is a French term meaning sex diversity, but the “mixing” implies a mixing of the
two sexes.  The use of this distinct term reflects a central distinction drawn in the French context,
even as diversity remains central in the United States.  While mixité refers to a clear binary of
male/female that is widely accepted in France, diversity carries a broader meaning in the United
States.  We use “sex” rather than “gender” because the quota’s key determination of who belongs
on boards mandates a binarist distinction between men and women, rather than a more fluid
framework.
3. AARON DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY:  CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE AND DIVERSITY (2015); see, e.g., Nicola Clark, Getting Women Into Boardrooms,
by Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/world/europe/28iht-
quota.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/FEA3-M89M (explaining that
Norway adopted a quota in 2003).
4. See Clark, supra note 3. 
5. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence
from Quotas, 5 AM. ECON. J.:  APPLIED ECON. 136, 137 n.5 (2013); see also EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, POSITIVE ACTION MEASURES TO ENSURE FULL EQUALITY IN PRACTICE BETWEEN MEN
AND WOMEN, INCLUDING ON COMPANY BOARDS (2012); James Kanter, E.U. Considers Quotas for
Women in Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/05/business/global/eu-considers-quotas-for-women-in-boardrooms.html?pagewanted=all,
archived at http://perma.cc/EB9K-ZS6U; Alison Smale & Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets
Gender Quota in Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/
world/europe/german-law-requires-more-women-on-corporate-boards.html?_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/WUZ5-8G4P.
6. See Kanter, supra note 5.
7. See Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity:  Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope
of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1174-78 (2005).
8. The CAC-40 is the French equivalent of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  It is a group
of forty of the largest and most prominent publicly traded corporations listed on the Paris Stock
Exchange.  Structure du Marché Français [French Market Structure], ABCBOURSE,
http://www.abcbourse.com/apprendre/1_plusiers_marches.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/R3NZ-MPGQ.  Among these leading French firms are some that date
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boards—eleven male and thirteen female—drawn from thirteen of the forty
CAC-40 firms.9  We interviewed seven additional subjects:  two civil society
leaders, two legislators, two recruiters, one coach, and one non-CAC-40 board
member.10  Interviews included a range of questions designed to assess the effect
of the quota and of the increased presence of women on corporate governance.11
Analyzing the interview results enables us to offer two preliminary findings
on the effect of the quota on corporate governance in France.  First, we find that,
at least in the view of corporate board members themselves, the quota has not
substantively affected corporate governance decisions, nor is it likely to do
so. Although sex composition of boards has changed,12 and in some instances
decision-making processes have changed, in the view of board member
participants, board decisions have not changed substantively because of sex.
Second, and importantly, our findings suggest that the quota has in fact had
a substantive impact, but not because of the sex of newly added board members. 
Rather, our interview results suggest that in the view of board members, newly
added female members have had a substantive impact on corporate governance
because they are outsiders.  For strategic reasons that we explore below, to
comply with the quota, French boards have appointed women members who are
more likely to be foreign, from non-elite professional and educational networks,
less experienced and from specialties not traditionally represented on boards, like
environment or labor.  Participants suggest that these traits, which are associated
with women’s outsider and newcomer status and not their sex, are potentially
back to the seventeenth century, as well as firms of much more recent vintage, global banks,
industrial conglomerates, firms that rely exclusively on private capital, companies with a heavy
participation by the state, and even a few old-fashioned, family-owned businesses.  See generally
James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 31 (1998).  
9. Darren Rosenblum organized and conducted all interviews.
10. Several others in France helped prepare the project design, including professors and one
CAC-40 in-house counsel.   
11. Methodological challenges include comparative issues in delving into another country’s
cultural and legal realities.  See infra Part III.  In addition, the problem of researching corporate
boards surfaces as a substantial impediment to any study.  The secrecy of corporate governance and
strategy make access difficult and direct observation impossible.  Board members in such large
firms are often former executives who are extraordinarily unavailable for research investigation.
12. A study by the Ethics & Boards Observatory found that CAC-40 firms have increased the
percentage of women on their boards to twenty-eight percent.  Post Assemblées Générales 2013: 
Les Femmes dans les Conseils du CAC 40 Au 25 Juin 2013 [Post General Meetings 2013:  Women
in the Boards of the CAC 40 at June 25, 2013], ETHICS & BOARDS (June 25, 2013).  The French
corporate board quota (“FCBQ”) requires a twenty percent rate of each sex by 2014.  See supra
note 2.  While companies have been able to comply thus far, filling in the remaining women
necessary under the quota may prove more challenging.  Julien Bonnet, Conseils d'Administration: 
Où Sont les Femmes? [Board of Directors:  Where are the Women?], L’USINE NOUVELLE (Feb. 12,
2013), http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/conseils-d-administration-ou-sont-les-femmes.
N191458, archived at http://perma.cc/44MZ-QL7U. 
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responsible for any difference in substantive board decision-making after the
quota.
Our study contributes to a small body of literature that assesses the impact
of sex on governance from the perspective of corporate board members using
qualitative interviews.13 Broome, Conley, and Krawiec14 interviewed United
States board members, asking them to give examples of how gender mattered;
from subjects’ difficulty in doing so, the team concluded that gender has had
little effect on corporate governance.15  Likewise, Conley et al. concluded in a set
of projects that the evidence from qualitative interviews for gender’s impact on
governance is thin: board members cannot produce concrete examples of how
and when diversity matters16 and according to participants, even boards that
maintain or achieve a critical mass of women do not produce distinctly feminine
process or substantive outcomes, like collaborative decision-making or family-
friendly work policies.17
Aaron Dhir’s work on the Norway quota18 reaches a different conclusion. 
Dhir finds support for the idea that gender makes a difference in corporate
governance, as participants report changes in the process of board meetings. 
Dhir’s subjects trace these differences to gender, though many of the differences
they report are also linked to the newcomers’ outsider status. 
This study makes several original contributions to the literature.  Initially, our
study is the first to interview participants from France, which like Norway, has
actually adopted a formal quota requiring firms to add women to their boards. 
In comparison to boards in the United States, which regulate themselves
voluntarily, French boards have legally been forced to grapple with the specific
issue of sex far more directly.19  Because women are entering corporate French
firms in unprecedented numbers, the link between sex and corporate
performance/governance has become far more salient for French board members,
making their observations more specific, and therefore more useful for
understanding the link between sex and corporate performance.
13. Our study also has a markedly distinct focus from United States literature on the French
corporate board quota.  For example, Julie Suk emphasizes the central role played by the corporatist
tradition in the passage of the law in France and the way in which the law functions to legitimize
the democratic state.  See Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy:  From Public Office
to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449 (2012).
14. See, e.g., John M. Conley et al., Narratives of Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: 
What Corporate Insiders Say About Why Diversity Matters, DISCOURSE PERSPECTIVES ON
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMC’N (2010); see also Lissa L. Broome et al., Dangerous Categories: 
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759 (2011).
15. Conley et al., supra note 14; Broome et al., supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 14; Broome et al., supra note 14.
17. Lissa L. Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter?  Views From The Boardroom, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1080 (2011).
18. DHIR, supra note 3.
19. Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 42 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 61, 77-78 (2009).
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Second, our work is among the first to assess the impact of the corporate
quota specifically among large firms, which traditionally resist equality-driven
legal mandates including those relating to sex; Dhir’s work on the Norway quota
focused on small firms.  Analysis of change at the CAC-40 firm—the most elite
firms in France—provides a useful point of comparison for purposes of exploring
the potential impact of legal regulation in the United States, even as the elite
nature of these firms may be relatively unrepresentative, and the cultural and
legal differences with the United States potentially significant.20
This Article will proceed in five parts.  In Part I, we provide the context for
our investigation by briefly reviewing the history of the French quota’s
enactment.  Part II reviews the theoretical literature on the effect of sex on
corporate board decision-making.  Most existing literature suggests that a critical
mass of women on corporate boards will improve corporate governance and the
firms’ overall performance. 
In Part III, we briefly describe the methodology used to obtain and conduct
interviews and to carry out the analysis.  Part IV describes the original individual
interview data collected from current and former members of corporate boards
from CAC-40 firms.  In Part V, we analyze our results.  Our analysis of the data
shows that the French quota likely has little effect on board decision-making
substantively, though it appears at least from the board’s perspective to affect the
process by which boards arrive at decisions.  Part V also discusses the important
finding that whatever effect sex diversity might have on corporate decision-
making might in fact be traceable to the new members’ outsider status and non-
traditional experience.
I.  HISTORY OF FRENCH QUOTA
A.  Parity and Pressure
The corporate board quota is not the first time that France has used a sex
quota.21  In 2000, the French legislature enacted the parity law, which requires
political parties to name women as half of all candidates.22  Feminists and
Socialists led the push for parity to remedy the chronic lack of women
representatives in positions of political power.  The legislature’s earliest efforts
to enact parity were met with rejection by the Constitutional Council, which is
authorized to review enacted laws prior to their implementation.23  In response
20. Any comparison between corporate regulation in the United States and France requires
greater attention to substantive differences between the two legal cultures.  See generally Fanto,
supra note 8.
21. See, e.g., ELEONORE LÉPINARD, L’EGALITÉ INTROUVABLE; LA PARITÉ, LES FEMINISTS ET
LA RÉPUBLIQUE [Impossible-to-Find Equality; Parity, Feminists and the Republic] (2007); JOAN
WALLACH SCOTT, PARITY! (2005); Rosenblum, supra note 7, at 1123.
22. LÉPINARD, supra note 21; WALLACH SCOTT, supra note 21; Rosenblum, supra note 7, at
1123.
23. Suk, supra note 13.
894 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:889
to the council’s decision, the legislature, through a supermajority, amended the
French constitution, which paved the way for subsequent enactment of the parity
quota.  Although the parity law did not achieve the gains its drafters and feminist
advocates had promised, the quota opened the door to the use of the quota in the
context of corporate governance.24 
French interest in a corporate board quota developed after Norway adopted
its quota in 2003.25  As of 2009, only ten percent of the directors of French listed
companies were female, and five percent of new board members were women,
well below the level of other countries.26  Only four publicly listed companies
had reached the twenty percent threshold.27  Private sector attempts at self-
regulation failed to forestall the quota’s advance.28  Proponents of the quota took
substantial notice of the quota’s success in Norway, which adopted a corporate
board requirement of forty percent in 2003.29
24. LÉPINARD, supra note 21.
25. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 3 (describing Norway’s adoption of a quota in 2003); DHIR,
supra note 3.
26. See François Roche, Conseils d’Administration: les Femmes Investissent le CAC 40
[Board of Directors:  Women Join the CAC 40], LA TRIBUNE (July 15, 2011), http://www.
latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20110715trib000636534/conseils-d-administration-les-
femmes-investissent-le-cac-40.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UN59-ZH2T; Institut Français des
Administrateurs, Journée Annuelle des Administrateurs 2010:  les Nouvelles Dynamiques du
Conseil [Annual Day of Directors 2010:  Dynamic News Board], 21 ADMINISTRATEUR:  LA LETTRE
DE L’IFA 1, 3 (2010); Veronique Morali, Les Femmes dans les Conseils d’Administration [Women
in the Board of Directors], LA GOUVERNANCE DES ENTREPRISES, CLÉ DE LA COMPÉTIVITÉ 24 n.409
(2011).
27. Institut Français des Administrateurs, supra note 26.
28. Since 1995 several business groups have produced effective corporate governance codes,
to which listed companies may voluntarily refer.  These include Viénot Reports one and two, the
Bouton Report, and the AFEP-MEDEF Report.  The “Association française des entreprises privées”
(“AFEP”) and the “Mouvement des entreprises françaises” (“MEDEF”) are the two leading
professional associations for private companies in France.  Now the code of reference for
companies issuing shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, the AFEP/MEDEF Code
established in April 2010 certain parity objectives to be achieved progressively for women on
boards of “at least twenty percent female directors within three years and at least forty percent
within six years.”  The AFEP/MEDEF Code may also apply to companies outside the FCBQ’s
scope.  All these reports were combined in a code, the code of corporate governance for listing
companies.  See Code de d’Entreprise des Sociétés Cotées [Corporate Code of Listed Companies],
AFEP (June 2013).  However, European Community law obligates the chair of the board of
directors (or supervisory board) to prepare a report on corporate governance, including whether the
firm complies with the AFEP/MEDEF code.  Non-compliance requires explanation.  The French
Financial Markets Authority (l’Autorité des marchés financiers, “AMF”) then publishes an annual
report that includes firms’ internal monitoring procedures.  See also Veronique Magnier & Darren
Rosenblum, Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance, 34 NW. U. L.
REV. 249 (2014).
29. Interview with 25F; interviews will be referred to by an identification number and M or
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Leading the push for the corporate board quota was the conservative Union
pour la Majorité Parlementaire (“UMP”) Party, led by then-President Nicolas
Sarkozy.30  Observing the lack of progress in women’s inclusion in the corporate
hierarchy, conservatives proposed a quota even as business signaled resistance
to this form of remedy.  In response to efforts by private sector leaders to
forestall public legislation with voluntary measures,31 co-sponsor of the quota,
Marie-Jo Zimmerman, opined that a quota was necessary to “get things to
move.”32  
Conservative focus on sex was largely strategic:  the push for the quota came
at the same time that conservatives had moved to ban burqas and were trying to
ban the wearing of long skirts.33  By modernizing the corporate boardroom to
include women, conservatives could more comfortably take a position against
“backward” practices such as traditional Muslim dress.34  Indeed, conservative
leader Jean-François Copé remarked in a public speech at a Paris colloquium that
“[t]he test of a society’s civilization is in how it treats its women.”35 
Beyond conservatives, a range of stakeholders—government, labor, and
others—supported the quota.  Public debate included reference to foreign
F to indicate sex; see infra note 83. 
30. One participant labeled Sarkozy as “a big feminist;” another, a legislator, said the
opposite.  See Interviews with 14F and 25F. 
31. La Quasi-Parité Imposée au Sein des Conseils d’Administration [The Quasi-Parity
Imposed on the Boards of Directors], LES ECHOS (Feb. 21, 2011), http://archives.lesechos.fr/
archives/cercle/2011/02/21/cercle_33475.htm#, archived at http://perma.cc/X64B-XHKY
[hereinafter LES ECHOS]; François Lenglet, Medef et Afep Promeuvent la Parité dans les Conseils
[Medef and Afep Promote Parity in the Boards], LA TRIBUNE (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.
latribune.fr/journal/edition-du-2004/politique-france/405290/medef-et-afep-promeuvent-la-parite-
dans-les-conseils.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VX96-JPYQ; see also Medef et Afep Promettent
Plus de Femmes dans les Conseils d’Administration [Medef and Afep Promise More Women in
Boards of Directors], L’EXPRESS (Apr. 20, 2010), http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/ actualite-
economique /med ef-e t - a fep -p ro met t en t -p lu s -de - femmes-dans- l e s -conse i l s -d -
administration_1339420.html, archived at http://perma.cc/97EL-D5BF.
32. Olivier Auguste, Les Grandes Entreprises Promettent la Parité [Large Companies
Promise Parity], LE FIGARO (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.lefigaro.fr/entreprise/2010/04/19/05011-
20100419ARTFIG00680-les-grandes-entreprises-promettent-la-parite-.php?pagination=2, archived
at http://perma.cc/QN4T-NMEA.
33. Kim Willsher, French Muslim Women on Burqa Ban Ruling:  ‘All I Want Is to Live in
Peace,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/
french-muslim-women-burqa-ban-ruling, archived at http://perma.cc/H8LH-YRDW.
34. Id.
35. Jean-François Copé, remarks at “Les femmes au conseil d’administration:  ça change
quoi?” (Women on Boards:  What Changes?) at the Association France-Amerique in Paris, France
(Sept. 26, 2011).  See Événements Récents [Recent Events], FRANCE-AMÉRIQUES, http://www.
france-ameriques.org/2011.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JM3U-
KQGC.
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progress, including that achieved in Norway.36  Jean Luc Châtel, the French Press
Secretary, signaled the Administration’s grudging agreement, noting that “the
quota is not necessarily the best solution, but at the same time we perceive that
if we do not legislate, we will have a hard time obtaining results.”37 
Some policymakers argued that the corporate board was not the proper
institution to require change.  For example, former Minister of Labor Xavier
Darcos suggested that the quota should mandate the addition of women to
executive committees, arguing that this is where a firm’s real decisions are
made.38  Darcos predicted that a board quota would not change much in the way
of corporate governance.39
Not surprisingly, members of the business community raised an objection to
the quota.40  In a conversation among thirteen women directors assessing the
36. As a general matter, European firms in general, and French firms in particular, already
tend to include stakeholder perspectives more fully when compared to firms in the United States. 
This pro-stakeholder perspective can be traced both to French corporatist traditions, in which the
state continues to play a more central role in the corporate sector, and to the fact that workers are
represented on the board.  See Magnier & Rosenblum, supra note 27; see also Viviane Reding,
Quota Français pour les Conseils d’Administration:  Pourquoi Pas? [French Quota for the Boards
of Directors:  Why Not?], LES ECHOS (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.lesechos.fr/01/03/2011/
LesEchos/20880-091-ECH_quotas-de-femmes-dans-les-conseils---pourquoi-pas--
.htm?texte=Quota%20Fran%C3%A7ais%20pour%20les%20Conseils%20d%E2%80%99Admin
istration:%20Pouhttp://www.lesechos.fr/01/03/2011/LesEchos/20880-091-ECH_quotas-de-
femmes-dans-les-conseils---pourquoi-pas--.htm?texte=Quota%20Fran%C3%A7ais%20pour%
20les%20Conseils%20d%E2%80%99Administration:%20Pourquoi%20Pas?rquoi%20Pas?,
archived at http://perma.cc/6XKH-28A5.  The article noted that many countries in the E.U. have
taken the measures to help women to get a high position in European society.  Id.  In Norway,
which adopted a quota in 2003, as of 2009, forty-two percent of the boards were women.  Id.
37. Marion Lippman, Quotas de Femmes:  le De ́bat Demeure Vif  [Quotas for Women:  The
Debate is Still Alive], 20MINUTES.FR (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.20minutes.fr/economie/561985-
unpublished-economie-quotas-de-femmes-le-debat-demeure-vif, archived at http://perma.cc/
MQ35-YDQS.  Even Laurence Parisot, the leader of the organization of top corporations,
L’Association Française Des Entreprises Priveés, admitted that “One cannot like quotas, but there
are circumstances where a thumb on the scale can unblock the situation.”  See also Auguste, supra
note 32.
38. “It would be much more interesting to know how women will be represented in the
Executive Committee, where decisions are really made.”  Lippman, supra note 37 (quoting Xavier
Darcos).
39. “The board of directors is the organ that represents shareholders . . . one can put more
women there, but if the majority shareholder puts men and the minority shareholders are
represented by women, that will not change much.”  Id. (quoting Xavier Darcos, lors d'un
déplacement à Rueil-Malmaison (Hauts-de-Seine), au siège du groupe Schneider Electric).
40. See, e.g., Yann Le Galès, Quotas:  13 Dirigeantes Jugent la Loi Qui Impose des Femmes
dans les Conseils d’Administration [Quotas:  13 Leaders Believe the Law Requires Women on the
Boards of Directors], LE FIGARO (Jan. 19, 2010), http://blog.lefigaro.fr/legales/2010/01/ conseils-
dadministration-10-femmes-jugent-la-loi.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R2HT-XYZU.
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proposed law, a well-known woman director, Patricia Barbizet, claimed that
quotas would necessarily be ineffective, because they would not produce any
change in people’s attitudes and a mandatory requirement would stigmatize
women.41  Likewise, a number of academics argued that shareholders and
administrators should choose whether to add women, free from legislative
mandate.42  In their view, “competence,” not sex, was what mattered.43
The legislature first adopted a corporate sex quota in 2006, but the
Constitutional Council struck it down, notwithstanding the Constitutional
amendment that had enabled the parity quota to be enacted.44  The Council
considered quotas in the corporate context to be a separate issue from the parity
quota, which had required sex parity in political representation.45  In response to
the court’s decision, the legislature passed yet another constitutional amendment
in 2008 to permit private quotas to promote women “to positions of professional
and social responsibility.”46  In addition, lawmakers also inserted Article 1, which
“essentially established the duty to promote [sex] parity as fundamental
constitutional law.”47  
B.  The Quota
Law 2011-103 (January 27, 2011)48 was entitled “On the equal representation
of men and women on boards of directors and supervisory boards and
professional equality.”49  In drafting what would become the final law,
conservative lawmakers replicated many features of the Norwegian quota.50  The
41. Id.
42. François-Xavier Lucas, Bulletin Joly Sociétés, Nov. 1, 2009 n.11, p. 945.
43. Id.
44. Suk, supra note 13 (citing Conseil constiutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision
No. 2006-533DC, Mar. 16, 2006, Rec. 39 (Fr.), Loi relative à l'égalité salariale entre les femmes
et les hommes) (based on Article 3 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Declaration of Rights
of Man).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing J.O., supra note 1).
47. Id.
48. J.O., supra note 1.
49. See Roche, supra note 26; see also LES ECHOS, supra note 31.
50. Aagoth Storvik & Mari Teigen, Women on Board:  The Norwegian Experience,
FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG 1, 4 (2010); Rules Regarding Gender Balance Within Boards of Public
Limited Companies, REGJERINGEN.NO (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter REGJERINGEN.NO].  Norway’s
Companies Act, amended in 2003, now reads:
§ 6–11a.  Requirement regarding the representation of both sexes on the board of
directors (1) On the board of directors of public . . . companies, both sexes shall be
represented in the following manner:  
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both sexes shall be represented.
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex shall be represented by
at least two.
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex shall be represented by
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law established the principle that boards of directors, supervisory boards of
private companies or joint-stock companies of any size, listed and unlisted, must
strive for an equal representation of men and women.51  Framed not as a sex-
specific quota but a floor for both sexes, the law required boards of directors,
supervisory boards of private companies or joint-stock companies of any size,
listed and unlisted, to strive for an equal representation of men and women.52 
The legislation established minimum percentages to be met and a schedule
for attaining these objectives:  a twenty percent minimum for both sexes by 2014
and forty percent by 2016.53  Firms subject to the requirement included (i) private
companies and joint-stock companies issuing shares and admitted for trading on
a regulated market and (ii) French corporations that, for three consecutive fiscal
years, employed at least 500 permanent staff members and produced an annual
revenue or balance sheet total of at least €50 million.54
Sanctions against non-compliant firms were designed to be swift and
significant:  non-compliant firms faced the revocation of non-compliant
nominations55 and the possibility of freezing board members’ fees.56  The French
quota stopped short of the Norwegian penalty of dissolution for non-compliant
firms.57  The French law required firms to comply with the quota in two stages: 
regulations mandated that firms have at least twenty percent women by January
1, 2014 and the full forty percent by January 1, 2017. 
at least three.
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be represented by at least
four, and if the board of directors has more members, each sex shall be represented by
at least 40 percent.
5. The rules in no. 1 to 4 apply correspondingly for elections of deputy directors.
51. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L225-17, L225-69, L226-4 (Fr.). 
52. Id.
53. See Magnier & Rosenblum, supra note 28, at 25.
54. Id.
55. Article 6 of the Act Number 2011-103 from 27th January 2011 provides:  
III. In public establishments and companies . . . the proportion of members of the board
of directors or of surveillance of each sex named . . . cannot be inferior to [twenty
percent] counting from the first renewal following the publication of this law.  When
one of the two sexes is not represented inside the board of directors or of surveillance
at the date of the publication of this law, at least one representative of this sex should
be named on the next vacancy . . . Any nomination in violation of [the above] and not
having for effect to remedy the irregularity of the composition of the board of directors
or of surveillance is void.
J.O., supra note 1.
56. Article 1 of the Act Number 2011-103 from 27th January 2011 provides:  “When a board
of directors is not composed conforming to [this statute] the planned payment of salary is
suspended.  The payment is reestablished when the composition of the board of directors becomes
regular.”  Article 1 of the Act Number 2011-103 from 27th January 2011.
57. REGJERINGEN.NO, supra note 50.
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C.  Quota Compliance
The FCBQ’s passage had an immediate effect.58  Although the first deadline
was three years away, firms of all sizes sharply increased their levels of women’s
representation.59  When the bill was introduced, nominations from general
meetings in 2010 doubled their existing percentages of women; almost a third of
new directors proposed were women, and thirty percent of CAC-40 companies
had reached the FCBQ’s twenty percent intermediate level by 2010.60  This
immediate reaction was strategic:  firms wanted to secure the membership of the
most “competent” women for their boards before other firms came calling.61
From preliminary information available, it appears that compliance for the
2014 deadline is quite high62—France’s Minister for Women’s Rights has
reported over thirty percent women on CAC-40 boards and 28.8% in the larger
SBF-120 group of French firms.63  Seven of the top ten global firms with high
levels of women’s representation are French.64  Firms now have set their sights
on meeting the forty percent deadline in 2017, though there are some concerns
58. A study done by Fédération des Femmes Administrateurs found that as of 2013, there was
an average of 26.6% of women with CAC-40 companies’ boards and 24.7% of women within SBF-
120 companies’ boards.  In addition, there was an average of four women on CAC-40 companies’
boards and three women on SBF-120 companies’ boards.  Of the SBF-120 companies, two-thirds
of the companies had between twenty percent and forty percent of women on their boards, five
percent exceeded forty percent of women on their boards, and eighty-three percent of women held
only one directorship.  Karima Bouaiss & Agnes Bricard, Femmes Administrateurs dans le SBF 120
en 2013:  Un État des Lieux [Women Directors in the SBF120 in 2013:  An Inventory],
ASSOCIATION DES FEMMES DIPLÔMÉES D’EXPERTISE COMPTABLE ADMINISTRATEURS (“AFECA”),
2014, at 1-29, available at http://www.federation-femmes-administrateurs.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/les-femmes-administrateurs-au-sein-des-conseils-dadministration-des-
societes-du-sbf-120-en-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/29N5-LR4R.
59. Id.
60. Institut Français des Administrateurs, supra note 26.
61. Interview with 18F. 
62. See supra note 58.
63. Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, La Part des Femmes dans les CA du CAC40 Dépasse 30% [The
Proportion of Women Within CAC40 Companies’ Boards Exceeds Thirty Percent], LE MONDE
(June 6, 2014), available at http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2014/06/05/la-part-des-
femmes-dans-les-ca-du-cac-40-depasse-30_4432274_3234.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3K4-
TT3S.
64. Corporate Women Directors International (“CWDI”) recently issued a study showing that
among the 200 biggest companies in the world, ranked according to the proportion of women
within boards, seven French firms rank in the top ten (SG, BNP Paribas, AXA, Total, GDF Suez,
Peugeot, Saint Gobain); see Tara Deronzier, La France est le Pays Qui Compte le Plus de Femmes
Dirigeantes [France is the Country with the Most Women Leaders], FOCUSUR.FR (June 13, 2014),
available at http://www.focusur.fr/actualites/2014/06/13/la-france-est-le-pays-qui-compte-le-de-
femmes-dirigeantes, archived at http://perma.cc/6MTP-N4H8.
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regarding compliance for smaller firms.65  Firm recruiting practices have also
begun to transform in the wake of the quota:  the majority of board members
report that their organizations have now begun to use executive search firms in
choosing new board members, male and female.66 
II.  THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST QUOTAS
A.  Empirical Links Between Sex and Performance
Much debate about sex quotas has centered on the “business case” for
quotas.  A body of empirical research suggests that firms with women in
leadership positions generate higher profits, return-on-equity, share prices, or
other financial benefits for a firm.67  These studies focus primarily on the firm’s
return on equity and other financial yardsticks of performance.68  A widely-cited
2007 study by Catalyst, Inc., a non-profit organization advocating for sex
65. An article in Le Journal des Entreprises anticipated difficulties with the 2016 deadline. 
There is uncertainty about how widely the quota will apply:  the target goals are aimed at companies
with greater than 500 employees and greater than 50 million euros in sales, but some of these
companies only have an executive committee and not a board of administrators.  In addition, for
companies located outside of Paris, the supply of potential female administrators is more limited. 
Marianne Peyri, Parité. Des Avancées Laborieuses [Parity. Laborious Progress], LE JOURNAL DES
ENTREPRISES (2014), available at  http://www.lejournaldesentreprises.com/
national/actualite/infrastructures/parite-des-avancees-laborieuses-06-06-2014-225718.php, archived
at http://perma.cc/YB84-B8YL.
66. Cross-ownership refers to corporate directors who serve on multiple corporations’
executive committee or corporate board reflecting conjoined ownership stakes.  Jay Dahya et al.,
Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards and Corporate Value:  A Cross-Country Analysis, 87
J. FIN. ECON. 73 (2008). 
67. Indeed, the business case literature proved relevant for the legislators who brought the
law to the National Assembly.  Jean-Francois Copé and Marie-Jo Zimmerman, both consistently
referenced the potential improvement in corporate governance that would flow from the FCBQ. 
Jean-François Copé referenced the business case:  “In ten years, the wealth of Europe will be its
human capital.  We need women and a real feminine leadership.  Also, the link between the
presence of women on boards and the performance of businesses is demonstrated by several
studies.”  Interview by Au Feminin TV with Jean-François Copé, Avancez avec Les Femmes,
(2011).  Zimmermann presented a report to the National Assembly advocating parity that referenced
the business case.  MARIE-JO ZIMMERMAN, Rapport d’Information Fait Au Nom de la Délégation
aux Droits des Femmes et a l’Égalite des Chances Entre les Hommes et les Femmes [Information
Report on Behalf of Women's Rights Delegation and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women]
(2011).  Zimmermann also referenced the Gresy Report that advocated for the quota.  BRIGITTE
GRESY, Rapport Préparatoire a la Concertation avec les Partenaires Sociaux sur l’Égalité
Professionelle Entre les Femmes et les Hommes [Preparatory Report for Agreement with Social
Partners on Professional Equality between Women and Men] (2009).  
68. Interview by Au Feminin TV with Jean-François Copé, Avancez avec Les Femmes,
(2011); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 67; GRESY, supra note 67.  
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inclusion, documented a positive correlation between the level of sex diversity
on a firm’s board and the firm’s returns on investment and equity.69  Other
studies have linked sex diversity to higher stock prices, though as with all such
studies, the researchers acknowledge that they are documenting only correlation
and not causation.70  Finally, a range of empirical analysis of the Norway quota
has linked sex diversity to economic growth, though Norwegian researchers had
found it difficult to control for the effects of the 2008 economic crash.71  French
69. Catalyst compared over 500 leading United States firms between 2001 and 2004 and
found a positive correlation between board diversity and performance.  Catalyst concluded that
firms with the greatest proportion of women board members showed significantly higher returns
on investment (“ROI”), return on equity (“ROE”), and return on invested capital than those with
the smallest proportion.  CATALYST, 2007 CENSUS:  BOARD DIRECTORS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2007-catalyst-census-women-board-directors-fortune-500,
archived at http://perma.cc/UX7K-XYF3.  A similar study by Erhardt et al. came to a slightly
different conclusion.   This study, which examined 112 leading firms over five years, found a
positive relationship between board diversity (gender, race, ethnicity) and both ROI and ROE, but
suggested that performance might be inducing diversity rather than vice versa.  Niclas L. Erhardt
et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102,
102-03, 109 (2003).
70. Another study conducted by Virtcom Consulting revealed that, over a five year period,
the stocks of companies with significant board diversity outperformed both the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the NASDAQ 100, though they did not outperform the Standard & Poor’s
500 (“S&P 500”).  VIRTCOM CONSULTING, BOARD DIVERSIFICATION  STRATEGY:  REALIZING
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 4-5 (2009).   Another study looking at the
effects of corporate workforce diversity on stock price showed that in research-intensive Fortune
1500 companies, adding women to the top management team increased stock price (Tobin’s q) in
the period 1992 to 2006.  CHRISTIAN L. DEZS & DAVID GADDIS ROSS, “GIRL POWER”:  FEMALE
PARTICIPATION IN TOP MANAGEMENT AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 1, 6-12 (2008).   Likewise, in a
study of sex and racial composition of Fortune 500 board committees between 1998 and 2002,
researchers found positive effects of diversity on ROI.   See David A. Carter et al., The Gender and
Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 396, 410–11 (2010).
71. Kenneth Ahern & Amy Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards:  The Impact on Firm
Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q. J. ECON. 137, 168 (2012) (finding
that stock prices and Tobin’s Q dropped after the imposition of the quota); Renée B. Adams &
Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance, 94
J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009) (finding women have better attendance records on boards than men, men
on diverse boards have better attendance records than men on homogeneous boards, and diverse
boards will focus more on monitoring); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of
Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution:  A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9
ECON. POL’Y REV. 7, 12 (2003) (reviewing literature on board composition and concluding there
is little evidence to suggest a relationship between composition and firm performance and a
negative correlative relationship between board size and firm performance); Benjamin E. Hermalin
& Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the
CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1998) (examining bargaining between the CEO and board of
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proponents of the quota cited to these studies in the campaign to adopt a
mandatory requirement. 
Corporate and management consultant studies also contribute to the literature
linking sex and performance.  McKinsey’s study, “Women Matter,” has argued
since 2007 that firms that included women in management performed better.72 
Likewise, a 2012 study by Credit Suisse confirms a correlation between share
price and return on equity performance and the inclusion of at least one woman
on the board.73  The Credit Suisse study cites several factors that women’s
inclusion may signal, including better effort across the board, better mix of
leadership skills, access to a wider pool of talent, a better reflection of
consumers, improved corporate governance, and greater risk aversion.74  On this
last point, the study links higher proportions of women to lower levels of debt,
a factor also linked to share price performance.75
It is important to note here that the existing empirical literature does not
uniformly support a positive association between sex diversity and improved
corporate performance.  A significant body of research find an empirical link
between gender diversity and negative outcomes.  Of particular note is post-quota
research linking the quota in Norway to diminished corporate performance.
Research on Norwegian firm valuations from business economists Ahern and
Dittmar in the wake of the Norwegian quota showed that firm valuations dipped,
in large part because the quota compelled firms to hire younger and less
experienced female board members.76  Similarly, economists Matsa and Miller’s
work suggests that Norwegian boards affected by the quota reduced their
workforces less than comparable firms, increasing labor costs and reducing short-
term profits.77  
In addition, as noted earlier, most studies caution that arguments for
causation are suggestive rather than conclusive.  More generally, empirical work
faces great difficulty in establishing a definitive link between a demographic trait
like sex and performance:  performance is affected by such a multitude of factors,
notably the variation of board-executive relations, and controlling for them all
directors and how boards are able to monitor the CEO); KNUT NYGAARD, FORCED BOARD
CHANGES:  EVIDENCE FROM NORWAY (2011) (after the quota was emplaced, firms with lower
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders experience positive cumulative abnormal
returns, while firms with high information asymmetry experienced negative cumulative abnormal
returns that were insignificant).
72. Women Matter, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, www.mckinsey.com/features/women_matter
(last visited Aug. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XD8Z-JDLV.
73. CREDIT SUISSE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE (2012).
74. Id. 
75. Id.
76. Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 71, at 167.
77. Matsa & Miller, supra note 5.  In line with Matsa and Miller’s study, Magnier and
Rosenblum have suggested that adding women to corporate boards will make boards more pro-
stakeholder.  See Magnier & Rosenblum, supra note 28.
2015] MORE THAN A WOMAN 903
might well be impossible.78  
B.  Theoretical Explanations for the Sex-Performance Link
Beyond empirical work, corporate governance theorists have identified a
range of institutional mechanisms that might help to explain how sex diversity
could translate into improved corporate performance.  One such mechanism is
the presence of the role models for women workers.79  In recent work drawing on
fifteen years of data from 1500 S&P firms, organizational management scholars
Dezso and Ross have argued that having women in top management motivates
females in middle management to perform and sharpens managerial performance
in firms focused on innovation.80  Having women at the top may encourage other
women to advance in the corporate hierarchy.81
 In the same vein, scholar Lisa Fairfax has proffered other mechanisms
through which sex and ethnic diversity in the boardroom might enhance a
corporation's bottom line.82  First, board diversity might make the corporation
more sensitive to the interests of consumers and employees, both groups that are
increasingly diverse.83  With regard to sex in particular, she asserts that
corporations with female leaders tend to favor flexible work hours and family life
policies.84  Diverse boards can help to reduce other costs that accompany a non-
diverse board:  diversification improves corporate image,85 reduces social and
78. Andrew Pettigrew, On Studying Managerial Elites, 13 STRAT. MAN. J. 163, 170 (1992).
79. CRISTIAN DEZSO & DAVID GADDIS ROSS, FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN TOP
MANAGEMENT. IMPROVE FIRM PERFORMANCE?  A PANEL DATA INVESTIGATION 1, 3 (2011).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Lisa Fairfax, Women and the "New" Corporate Governance, Clogs in the Pipeline:  The
Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV.
579, 602-05 (2006). 
83. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1384-85 (2002).
84. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BD., BOARD
DIVERSITY IN U.S. CORPORATIONS:  BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF CORPORATE
BOARDS 8 (1999).  These tendencies toward more flexible policies should lead to increased
employee and consumer satisfaction—fostering less employee turnover and minimizing the costs
associated with turnover, as well as encouraging repeat customers.  James K. Harter et al., Business-
Unit-Level Relationship Between Employee Satisfaction, Employee Engagement, and Business
Outcomes:  A Meta-Analysis, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 268, 273-74 (2002). 
85. A European Commission study validated this theory finding that diversity programs not
only had a positive impact on employee motivation, but also noted an increase in customer
satisfaction (fifty-seven percent) and an improvement in brand image (sixty-nine percent). 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY (2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/report_gender-
balance_2012_en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/59S9-PJH9.
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economic costs of discrimination and harassment,86 and enables boards to
identify broader market opportunities and tap wider market power.87  
Research indicates that women make a difference in large part by changing
aspects of a group’s process.88  For example, a study by organizational
behaviorist Anita Woolley and her team has linked women’s presence to different
kinds of communication in a group setting.89  They argue that women are better
at social perception, and are more able to take turns rather than dominating a
team discussion, which in turn reduces the likelihood that a team will suffer from
groupthink.90  Another study by Carnegie Mellon measured the “collective
intelligence” of a small group of people and found that, all else being equal,
teams with more women scored higher than teams with fewer women.91 
Researchers concluded that increasing sex diversity enhanced the board’s overall
effectiveness by facilitating higher quality decisions through improved
monitoring, mitigating groupthink, and boosting collective intelligence.92  More
efficient teams were less often dominated by a few group members and were
more open to diverse viewpoints.93
Research linking gender diversity with differences in process supports the
link between gender and these process differences, particularly as those relate to
corporate accountability.  A 2001 study by the Conference Board of Canada
linked gender diversity on boards to a range of accountability practices. 
According to the board’s internal research, ninety-four percent of firms with
three or more women monitored the implementation of corporate strategy (vs.
sixty-six percent of all-male firms); ninety-four percent of gender-diverse boards
86. Fairfax, supra note 82, at 579 (citing Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom,
6 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 108-09 (2000)). 
87. Id. at 579 (citing Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board:  The Perils of Groupthink,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1308 (2003)).  Marleen O’Connor termed it “market reciprocity,” how a
diverse board responded to broader groups.  O’Connor, supra at 1308.  Fairfax provides the
poignant example of Jill Kerr Conway, the first woman director at Nike.  Conway encouraged her
fellow board members to begin marketing to women, a strategy that has proved extremely profitable
as the newly targeted market has reciprocated into a significant portion of Nike’s business.  See also
Carol Hymowitz, In the U.S., What Will It Take to Create Diverse Boardrooms?, WALL ST. J., July
9, 2003, at B1.
88. Some studies show that female board members have higher attendance at meetings and
women are more open to joining monitoring committees.  Adams & Ferreira, supra note 71, at 308. 
This study linked improved attendance and monitoring to stock price increases.  See also DEZSO
& ROSS, supra note 79, at 6-12 (suggesting that women may bring particular strengths to research
intensive industries, thus the “female participation effect should be particularly significant when
collaboration and creativity are especially important”).
89. Anita Williams Woolley et al., Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the
Performance of Human Groups, 330 SCIENCE EXPRESS 686, 688 (Sept. 30, 2010).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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ensure the enactment of conflict-of-interest guidelines (vs. sixty-eighty percent);
and firms with women on their boards were more likely to use committees and
in particular an executive committee to assist corporate decision-making.94
More generally, research has suggested that sex diversity matters because
women bring with them different approaches to decision-making, offering fresh
descriptive categories, and novel decision-making frameworks, heuristics, and
classification systems.95  Political scientist Scott Page has reviewed a wide range
of empirical studies on the connection between diversity on a number of traits
and performance.96  Page focuses on the way in which different groups of people
offer maps of reality that differ in terms of their categories, frameworks,
heuristics, and classification systems.97  For example, biologists see the world
differently than physicists, because they organize information according to
different frameworks, categories, and classifications.98 
Importantly, Page notes that diversity matters in some instances and not in
others:  diverse approaches are useful when groups are engaged in innovative
tasks and experience little difficulty in communication, but are less useful when
groups are engaged in routine and repetitive tasks requiring little innovation or
problem solving.99  In sum, Page suggests that sex matters because it brings in
diversity on other axes that are associated with sex.100  
Whether diversity matters because of communication or decision-making
frameworks, the relative number of women on a corporate board is likely to
affect whether sex diversity is linked to differences in performance.101  Business
sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter identifies the key threshold that constitutes a
critical mass as thirty-five percent.102  Below this threshold, the majority can
simply ignore a minority’s presence; above the threshold, women can exert
sufficient influence to change the group’s decision-making in meaningful
94. Vanessa Anastasopoulos et al., Women on Boards:  Not Just the Right Thing, But the
Bright Thing, THE CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, 5-6 (2002), available at http://www.
conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=374, archived at http://perma.cc/LN89-BZB3.
95. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 7, at 324-25.  
96. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE:  HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 314 (2007).
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 30-48.
99. Id. at 323-26.
100. Id. 
101. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life:  Skewed Sex Ratios
and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966, 988 (1977).  Kanter argued that only
structural change in organizations might achieve real shifts in the allocation of power, and these
structural changes would in turn change people as individuals, while changing the mere identity of
individuals would not alter the corporation overall. 
102. Id. at 988.  This idea of critical mass motivated corporate board quota (“CBQ”) advocates
in Norway to push for a forty percent threshold for the “minority” sex.  Sex minorities will be
excluded from decisions unless they attain a “critical mass”—in sufficient numbers, minorities are
in a position to demand that the organization include their opinions.  See DHIR, supra note 3.
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ways.103  A more recent study argues that when three or more women are present
on a board, women no longer represent “women” but are instead seen as
individuals, and that at that point their collaborative style might begin to
“influence the content and process of board discussions more substantially.”104
At the same time, determining the precise threshold of diversity that
constitutes critical mass will depend on the way in which sex matters.  For
example, if diversity improves stock price because women are more risk averse,
then the level of diversity that would constitute critical mass will depend on the
dynamics of decision-making with regard to risk.105  In contrast, if sex diversity
improves performance because quotas tap into a new pool of talent, the threshold
for critical mass might be lower.106
III.  DATA AND METHOD
Our analysis draws upon interview data collected in connection with the
study.  Between October of 2011 and February of 2012, we organized thirty-one
interviews with CAC-40 board members and thirty-six individual interviews of
subjects who had knowledge about corporate board decision-making in France. 
Twenty-three of the interviews were with current and former members of
corporate boards from CAC-40 French firms.  The remainder consisted of seven
103. Earlier work establishes the limited effect of token representation.  See Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder:  What Minorities Do When They
Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1689-90 (2004); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism:  The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1077 (1991).
104. Vicki W. Kramer et al., Executive Summary, Critical Mass on Corporate Boards:  Why
Three or More Women Enhance Governance, 11 WELLESLEY CTRS. FOR WOMEN REP. 3 (2006)
[hereinafter Kramer et al., Critical Mass on Corporate Boards].
105. See Michel Ferrary, When Gender Diversity Protects Stock Prices From the Crash,
CERAM BUSINESS SCHOOL (2009); Michel Ferrary, Why Women Managers Thrive in a Down Turn,
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27836d74-04e4-11de-8166-
000077b07658,dwp_uuid=1d22aad4-0732-11de-9294-000077b07658.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/KUZ9-JV2N.  Michel Ferrary (CERAM Business School, France) found a direct
correlation between the proportion of women in top management at a corporation and its stock price
during a time of general economic downturn.  He found that, “the more women there were in a
company’s management, the less the share price fell in 2008.”  Ferrary suggests that women
managers tend to avoid risk and focus more on a long term perspectives, balancing the risk-taking
style of their male colleagues, a trait especially important in protecting profits in bad times.  
106. Ronald Burke, Women on Canadian Corporate Boards of Directors:  Still a Long Way
to Go, WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 97 (2000).  According to Burke, there are
not currently enough talented male directors to fill open spots.  CEOs are rejecting invitations to
join boards at increasing rates and men currently serving on boards do not have the time to take on
additional responsibilities.  This makes the continued reliance on male CEOs for board members
less practical and potentially dilutes quality.  Accordingly, firms must expand their searches beyond
the traditional talent pools. 
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interviews of industry experts, academics, and the principal sponsor of the
statute.107  Aggregate characteristics of the board member interviewees are shown
in Table 1.
Table 1. Demographic Data N=24
n n female 
Gender 
Male
11
Female 13
Seniority 
Junior (under 55)
4 3
Mid-level (55-65)
13 6
Senior (65+) 7 4
Multiple Boards 
Yes
7 6
No 17 1
Industry 
Consumer
4 2
Finance
4 3
Industrial
10 5
Service/Telecom
6 2
French
22 11
Foreign 2 2
In recruiting participants for the interviews, we targeted members of CAC-40
firms, and recruited via sex-specific snowball sampling.108  The fact that the
107. A full transcript, a redacted transcript, and a translated redacted transcript are on file with
the authors.  As noted earlier, all interviews will be referred to by their identification number with
an “M” or an “F” marking the sex of the interviewee, i.e., “Interview with 19F.” 
108. Participants were asked to recommend an additional male and female prospective
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sample was evenly divided between male and female does not reflect the still-
persistent sex imbalance found in the subject population; the oversample of the
female population was deliberate to avoid the possibility that a representative
sample would reflect a predominantly male account of board decision-making,
a possibility quite salient to the results of the study.  
In addition to corporate board members, we interviewed two French
legislators, one of whom was the author of the bill proposing the sex quota. 
Other interviews included two search professionals, a coach, and five academics,
whose input was useful to understanding and putting into context the board
member interviews. 
Nearly all interviews were conducted in French.  Interviews were open-
ended; the interviewer worked from a set of questions that served to guide the
individual interviews.109  Most interviews lasted approximately one hour and
mostly took place at the member’s place of work.  All but one of the interview
sessions were audio-recorded with the consent of the participants, and all of the
recordings were later transcribed and then, for most, translated from French to
English.110  To protect anonymity of the board members and their firms, all
references to individuals and their firms have been redacted and replaced by
coded identification numbers in the following discussion. 
We collected data on corporate board members’ attitudes about sex and
corporate board decision-making.  Questions pertained to four distinct but related
topics:  the interviewee’s board experience, the interviewee’s opinion on the
firm’s compliance with the quota, and whether the quota would affect the
functioning of the board with regard to process and with regard to substance. 
More specifically, participants were asked a range of questions relating to the
subjects’ perceptions of the difference that sex diversity on the board had had on
board meetings and corporate performance.  To distinguish process from
substance, questions asked participants to distinguish their experience of the
interactions on the board (process) and the substantive decisions made by the
board (substance).  The temporality of the questions and answers varied:  some
responses were retrospective while others were prospective, and even those
grounded in past experience necessarily faced limits because few of them had
spent much time during the period in which no women were present on corporate
boards.111
participant.
109. Preliminary research revealed that it would be impossible to acquire enough advance
knowledge to fashion a set of uniform questions that would yield objective data disposed to a
quantitative analysis prior to performing the interviews.  Instead, we opted to use open-ended,
qualitative study in order to enable participants to express the nuance of their opinions and
experiences.  See ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: 
GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 23 (1990).  
110. One subject refused.  Extensive notes of this conversation were used in place of a
transcript.
111. For example, as one female board member stated:  “So I can see what is running today,
I do not know what it was before.  I cannot compare before and after.  [In my current position] I just
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As much as possible, we have attempted to preserve the authentic voice,
corporate norms, and colloquialism of the participants in the translation process. 
For example, we took care to preserve the distinction between diversity and
mixité, or the mixing of sexes, which both refers to sex difference specifically
and distinguishes sex difference from other kinds of diversity as a subject for
legal remedy.  The use of this distinct term reflects a central distinction drawn in
the French context between the two concepts, even as diversity remains central
in the United States.
We note at the outset that the method of interviewing corporate board
members themselves to assess the link between sex and corporate performance
necessarily has both strengths and some significant limitations.  On the plus side,
corporate board members’ inside perspective on the functioning of firms means
that they are more likely to understand both the big picture overview of corporate
board function and the details of that function.  The members themselves are
more likely to understand day-to-day micro-details of decision-making and the
dynamics of board meetings.  
In this study, qualitative interviews were chosen in order to shed light on
whether and what mechanisms connect the sex composition of a corporate board
to the performance of the firm.112  In the same vein, qualitative interviews are
well-suited to provide fertile ground to enable scholars to generate hypotheses
for future work; as we discuss more fully in the conclusion, this project provides
a number of testable hypotheses regarding the addition of women to a corporate
board and firm performance.113
At the same time, and perhaps for the same reasons, the interview as primary
method necessarily had significant limitations.  As participants, board members
may have been too close and too invested in a particular view of governance to
have an objective perspective.  More importantly, most board members may have
been too limited in their capacity to identify links between sex and differences. 
Participants were likely limited in their capacity to even perceive sex differences,
or to distinguish their presence in process or substantive decision-making, let
alone to sort out whether sex matters in corporate performance—indeed, several
resisted the idea outright.  In addition, many board members have served only on
mixed-sex boards and have no framework for comparison to detect sex
differences. 
More generally, the qualitative interview has limited reliability in terms of
providing accurate descriptions of what happens in the corporate boardroom,
relying in a second-order way on our interpretation and analysis of board
members’ interpretations of corporate board experience.114  To address this
arrived, I do not know how it was before.”  Interview with 15F. 
112. Pettigrew, supra note 78, at 171.
113. Erica Schoenberger, The Corporate Interview as a Research Method in Economic
Geography, 43 PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 180, 181 (1991).  This study also draws on research
design based in Grounded Qualitative Theory.  BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE
DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY:  STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967).
114. GLASER & STRAUSS, supra note 113, at 183.
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challenge, in addition to asking more open-ended questions, we prompted
participants by asking them about potential sex differences on corporate boards
identified by previous research.  This technique helped to focus participants on
potentially important differences that they may or may not have connected to sex,
although members’ limited ability to spot such differences might still constitute
a significant limitation.115
Finally, this project faced comparative challenges.  Legal and cultural gaps
between the United States and France required us to attend carefully to a rigorous
comparative method to understand the full nature of the comparison in corporate
governance norms.116  Where appropriate, we have remarked on the presence of
potential cultural differences and attempted to highlight those ways in which our
results might not generalize to the United States or more broadly to other
countries.  At the same time, the opportunity to study French corporate boards
represented a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of sex on corporate
boards operating under the requirements of the quota.
IV.  RESULTS:  PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE
Three themes dominated the participants’ responses to interviewer questions: 
(i) Sex diversity affected the process of board decision-making because the
presence of women changes group dynamics and communication; (ii) Sex
diversity did not affect, so far as subjects could detect, the substantive decisions
that the boards made, at least insofar as the focus of such diversity was the
female-ness of newly added members; and (iii) To the extent that new members
of the board had an impact on substantive outcomes, it appeared likely that this
was less because they were women and more because they were outsiders who
came from different countries, different schools, and with different areas of
expertise. 
A.  Effect of the Quota and Sex Diversity on Process
1.  Differences in Quality of Participation.—Discussion with participants
115. Schoenberger, supra note 113, at 187.
116. Darren Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender:  Why International Law Theory Should Adopt
Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 759, 776-84 (2007).  A comparative study
requires intense familiarity with and examination of local context as a means to arrive at a fuller
understanding of the import and meaning of the law studied. A risk with all comparative work
is that the study may better reflect the values of the observer rather than the observed. 
Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190 (2002).  To minimize this risk, this
study’s comparative methodology draws on careful contextual knowledge to ensure that appropriate
care has been used in drawing conclusions and effecting translations across cultures.  Comparative
work poses several challenges, but it fits neatly with the grounded theory approach to
qualitative studies in that both involve an awareness of the subjectivity of the scholar
within the study itself.  See generally Günther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons:  Re-thinking
Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985); Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: 
Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 222 (1999). 
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made clear that they thought women’s presence on boards had affected the
process of decision-making, and in particular, the level of member participation
and the quality of their reasoning.  First, women appear to be more likely to raise
new points, and to raise difficult subjects openly.117  Several board members
stated that women reserved their comments for fresh perspectives, in contrast to
men who were more likely to repeat points made earlier:  
Women have a habit of censoring themselves—observe a group where
there are only men and one or few women, and the men will always
speak first.  Always.  And when the women speak it is to say something
different.  If they have to say the same thing, or something approximate,
they stay quiet.118
Participants also noted a sex difference in the precision with which women
posed questions or made comments (both in their point and in their manner). 
Participants reported that women board members were more “detail oriented,”119
or as others put it, more “methodical.”  Women appeared to the subjects to be
more openly willing to raise concerns:  board members reported that where men
feared expressing their ignorance, the women voiced those doubts openly:
I think that women possibly have a tendency to dare to say what they
don’t understand and to pose questions while men possibly would be a
bit scared of being perceived as the one who does not know and thus it’s
better to not ask and to be discreet when one does not understand.120
Women were also reported to be more likely to ask questions designed to
elicit additional information.  One of the subjects opined, “[T]here’s a tendency
to pose questions like:  ‘I’m not sure that I understand why they’re proposing to
do this’ and often when there are questions like that, not necessarily posed by
women, but in this circumstance women pose these questions more easily and
finally there’s someone who says ‘Oh yeah, me neither.  I don’t understand and
can you explain this.’”121  Another female board member said:  “I think it is more
transparent and on the table.  I mean, for women, there are no stupid questions
we pose.  It is much more honest, it is much less . . . ‘Ah, I will not say that
because my neighbor will think . . . .’”122 
In line with previous research, these results suggest that women’s presence
on the board might force fuller explanations to surface, a general theme
articulated by many of the board members.  One board member articulated that
the way men communicate without women present is by using “shortcuts,” or
communicating without saying everything.123  In the participants’ view, this loss
117. Interview with 12F. 
118. Id.
119. Interview with 14F. 
120. Interview with 4F.
121. Id.
122. Interview with 19F.
123. Interview with 13F.
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of the ability to speak in shorthand had the effect of pushing boards to articulate
their reasoning more fully.
One woman participant, who had a great deal of board experience and was
particularly reticent to articulate that a sex difference existed, said that she
thought this manner of communication in which the “naïve” questions posed by
women make the discussion explicit, forced the board to detail its reasoning.124 
As another female board member said:  “it happens that women ask hard
questions more easily and finally there is someone who says ‘ah yes, me neither,
I don’t understand so could you explain it to us?’  Although if nobody asked this
question in the first place, the subject would just go by without discussion.”125 
Beyond the kind of questions asked, many participants asserted that women
presented more “reasoned” arguments.126
At the same time, other participants expressed the opinion that women did
not affect the process of board decision-making.  Indeed, one board member said
that women’s presence did not make a difference at all.127
2.  Differences in Confrontationalism.—Sex diversity also appears to have
affected the tone of board interactions.  One participant noted that after her first
meeting—the first with a woman present—the men had said to her, “That was the
best meeting we ever had.  We fought about nothing and tried to discuss things
calmly.”128  French subjects were likely to frame this in terms of etiquette and
civility:  
That there are women on boards changes necessarily the situation
compared to when there were not.  Because men, from the instant they
are in the presence of women, adopt civil behavior that are not what they
use when they are among guys.129
Not only did women avoid combative posturing, but several participants also
noted women’s “civilizing” effect on male behavior in meetings.  As one (male)
board member said, “Because men, once they’re in the presence of women, adopt
a civil behavior that is not what they allow themselves when they are among
men.”130  The fact that men behave differently around women may serve as the
basis for several of the discussion-related differences that occur with the
presence of women on the board of directors.131
Several participants (many of them women) noted that women were less
territorial or power-driven in their participation.  Although one female board
member argued that women should not be perceived as having “hairdresser
124. Interview with 7F. 
125. Interview with 4F.
126. Interview with 21F.
127. Interview with 18F.
128. Interview with 3F.
129. Interview with 5M.
130. Id.
131. Although one male board member implied that men did not behave differently when
women were around.  Interview with 22M. 
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conversations,” at the same time, women were perhaps “more sociable,” and they
“do not live a conversation as a power play.”132  Other female board members
said that men’s comments tended to be more “territorial,” occurring between
“males in a dominant position:  ‘I mark my territory and don’t [you] touch my
turf.’”133
In discussing women’s influence, participants pointed out the role of French
custom with regard to etiquette between the sexes.  Thus, one female board
member noted that owing to “French gallantry, if two people raise their hands
and it happens one is a man and the other a woman, the man will systematically
propose that it be the woman who speaks first.”134  Another (male) participant
attributed the same fact to the custom that newer members are invited to speak
first, and since the women tend to be more recent arrivals, they speak first.135
As this last set of comments demonstrates, often participants agreed on
observations, but disagreed on whether the source was a woman’s female nature
or some other aspect of her participation.  For example, one female board
member used stereotypical language in arguing that women employ a softer and
more “feminine” tone, especially about “disagreeable” things, or “bothersome”
issues:
So because we [women] do not say the same things and in particular
disagreeable things with the same tone.  We say it more softly with more
femininity . . . I find, as long as one stays a woman.  I’m not saying that
you have to have skirts up to one’s ass.  But staying feminine, staying
oneself, I consider it a goal, because we’re in a world of men, and that,
it’s worth saying, it is not the same thing.136
In sum, with regard to process, important changes were credited to women’s
presence, including some more methodical, even reasoned deliberation, with
fewer “shortcuts,” less conflict, and more civil behavior during the process of
board deliberation. 
B.  Effects of Sex Diversity on Substantive Decision-making
Beyond process, interviewees also were asked whether the board’s
substantive decisions had shifted as a result of women’s presence.  As a general
matter, when asked whether sex diversity affected voting by the board of
directors, many resisted the premise of the question, opining that sex could not
make a substantive difference.  When pressed on particular topics, like whether
women were more likely to oppose workforce reductions, most members
answered in the negative (though as discussed below, one female board member
noted that in a recent board vote on executive pay, the only negative votes on her
132. Interview with 19F.
133. Id.
134. Interview with 15F.
135. Id.
136. Interview with 3F.
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board were cast by two women).137
1.  Participant Resistance.—Getting participants to focus on the question of
substance was initially quite difficult; many participants rejected at the outset the
notion that sex (as opposed to other traits or experiences) could make a
dispositive difference in substantive choices by the board.  One senior female
board member said:  
Here we are new members, but we do not feel we have a women’s role
to play more than an administrator role, or put in play our own
personality and our own past experience.  So me what I bring over other
is industrial experience I gained in . . . , but others bring more
management experience or financial experience, so this is where I stand
out.138
One male executive concurred:  “I have the tendency to think it’s because
above all they (board members) have excellent personal skills whether they are
men or women.  And if they ask good questions it’s because they are good with
breasts or without breasts.”139  Put in less sexist terms, this male member
suggested that what mattered were skills, not the sex of the board member.
One male board member represented the views of many men and women
participants alike, saying that he found the idea completely “absurd:”  
Are they more rigorous?  I know many women who are rigorous and
others who are less so, as with men.  One is rigorous or not.  The
division isn’t about whether one is a man or a woman.  It’s absurd to say
that it will change something.  As if we were as different as the moon
and the sun.  We are happily much closer than different.140
Some members raised the possibility that women members had adopted
distinctively masculine characteristics (a strategy discussed in the literature on
women’s strategic efforts to fit into male environments).  For example, one male
member said pointedly, “They were more guys than the guys.”141  Another male
board member said the following:  
And that in the careers which are those of men above all—please do not
hold this against me what I am going to say because I am almost
ashamed even before saying it—but the ladies who succeed frequently
in the top jobs at the beginning are . . . actually I have two under whom
I have worked, they were, I think I can say this, they were more guys
than the guys.  To say that they brought diversity is a vision, a view of
the spirit.  It is biologically [true] but it is true only biologically.142
137. Interview with 4F.
138. Interview with 7F.
139. Interview with 6M.
140. Interview with 11M.
141. Interview with 1M. 
142. Id.
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Members’ resistance to the potential effect of sex on substance was all the
more striking in light of consensus that women’s presence did affect the decision-
making process.  Implicitly, the subjects seemed to believe that differences in
process did not produce differences in the substantive outcomes of such process. 
One possible explanation for this dichotomy is that members see substantive
decisions as relatively predetermined.  In France, board members defer heavily
to executive strategy, usually to approve it.143  Given this deference, which some
scholars report is more acute in the French context, members might find it
unlikely that sex (or any other factor for that matter) affects corporate board
decision-making.144 
2.  Offering Participants Alternative Substantive Scenarios.—To prompt
subjects to think about the kinds of substantive differences found in previous
research, some participants were asked whether boards with women were more
likely to differ substantively with regard to those particular traits or
subjects—like labor and workforce reduction, risk aversion, or an increased
stakeholder focus.145  In general, participants were reluctant to agree with these
ideas.  As one female board member said:  
There’s a sort of socialization in the societal sense of the members of the
board that makes us that one is interested in subcontractors, one is
interested in workers, one is interested in corporate social responsibility,
one is interested, obviously in the environment . . . this all concerns a bit
everyone on the board.  To different degrees:  I am sure that those who
come from banking or finance are more interested in cash flow and
operational margin and less in this [social issues].  Coming back to the
diversity of boards, so to say that women are more like this, I’m a little
reticent to the extent that I see [a high level female executive on the
board] react.  She is less sensitive than I am on these issues.146
C.  More Risk Averse Outcomes
In the earliest public discussions around the quota’s adoption, the idea that
women were more risk averse played an important role.  Following the debate
and earlier research,147 participants were asked whether they observed women
143. Id.
144. Fanto, supra note 8, at 53 n.108 (citations omitted) (In France, “[g]eneral research on
boards of directors suggests that the director's background, as well as other social factors, such as
group behavior and loyalty, conspire to ensure that boards are deferential to management and
passive in protecting shareholder rights . . . .  The French situation is more acute since chief
executives in large French companies have almost dictatorial powers.”).
145. See, e.g., Matsa & Miller, supra note 5, at 137 n.5; CREDIT SUISSE, supra note 73; Kent
Greenfield, Defining Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043 (2008); Kent
Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008).
146. Interview with 12F. 
147. See FERRARY, supra note 105. 
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members or boards with women making more risk-averse decisions or playing a
role on audit committees.
Subjects were mostly resistant to the idea.148  One male board member
admitted that women might be more risk-averse, but that this difference did not
have much impact “because management elaborates the strategy.”149  A few
participants opined that sex in fact played some role in risk aversion, but argued
that women were more insistent on accurate measurement of risk, rather than
more risk averse.  
One female participant stated the idea this way:  “[W]e will take risks if we
have carefully measured them if we’re in agreement on the fundamentals . . . but
it’s not a refusal of risks, it is a different manner of analyzing that we do not lose
reality.  For me that is more the feminine attitude.”150
Likewise, another member promoted the view that women’s orientation
toward detail might lead to a more accurate appreciation of risk:  
Compared to risks taken, no, I have not felt a different attitude between
men and women.  Actually, again, to have more precise elements that
allow a real clarification of the decision, women put more in than men. 
So it’s to know well how to measure and appreciate risk in a more
probing way, yes.151
Both of these comments (and several more like it) reflect the idea that women
are not “risk-averse” per se, but that deliberate consideration (perhaps motivated
by lack of experience) might lead to a more accurate assessment of risk.
D.  More Policies Favoring Corporate Social Responsibility and
Affirmative Action for Women
In line with earlier research, some participants also discussed whether
women board members had persuaded corporate boards to adopt family-friendly
policies.152  Board members responded that although women might be inclined
to adopt more family-friendly policies, this was not because they were women,
but because they tended to be younger and thus more likely to have younger
children.153  Likewise, this skepticism with regard to specific social issues
surfaced elsewhere, with regard to firms that paid more attention to “working
life.”154 
148. Interview with 21F. 
149. Interview with 22M. 
150. Interview with 19F. 
151. Interview with 7F. 
152. See BRANCATO & PATTERSON, supra note 84.
153. Interview with 17F. 
154. Interview with 13F (“[It gives] a good image of the company.  It is therefore better to
have more social services, social contributions within the company.  It’s better than not having.  It
does not depend on the weight of women on the board, and then it goes in the right direction.  If
this is easy, as part of working life for women, it will be easier for men too.  There, also for people
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Participants did acknowledge differences with regard to women members’
attitudes towards corporate social responsibility:  
[I]t is important that the company in its business model asks the question
of its social responsibility and therefore requires that the board takes this
dimension and does not only leave it to the management.  And the
presence of women, including more diverse board members should allow
the board to disconnect from solely financial criteria to go to the extra-
financial which has for the company a strong impact and which is
important for its performance.155
Another participant opined that women “would probably be more attentive
to any sort of corporate social responsibility issues,” although increased
corporate social responsibility is also a trend more generally.156 
At least one participant suggested that women board members influenced
board substantive decisions that promoted women to positions of power and
responsibility:  
[W]hat is important is that women who are on the board promote
women’s access to positions of responsibility within the company.  So
in fact, women on the board in their role, apart from being a director like
everyone else, it may be particularly likely to ensure that the company
enables women to take leadership positions.  So I do think that there is
this desire, women who are on the board today, are particularly ensuring
more women in positions of responsibility in the company.157
E.  Process and Substance:  Stakeholder Perspectives
Consistent with the earlier research from Norway suggesting that boards with
more women are more reluctant to engage in workforce reduction,158 participants
were asked whether boards with more women were more likely to consider the
interests of labor or other stakeholders.
Some interviewees were receptive to the idea that women might be more
sensitive to stakeholder interests,159 that “women will be more careful about what
they will not actually see themselves.  They will try to imagine what the
with disabilities so if you have a favorable business to accept inclusion.  But in fact there are two
things, we do it because we share this value or because we want to give a good image . . . .  Or both
can be together in parallel.  But I do not see that it is because we have more women in the CA that
goes in this direction.  That I do not know, I cannot . . . .  But I know that the staff is happy when
there are women on the board.  That is good.”). 
155. Interview with 17F. 
156. Interview with 29M. 
157. Interview with 17F. 
158. Matsa & Miller, supra note 5, at 137 n.5.  
159. Interview with 8F; see also Interview with 16M. 
918 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:889
consequences might be for the stakeholders.”160  In explaining this sensitivity,
some members relied on stereotypes:  one male board member commented that
women would consider stakeholders more because they “have to take care of
children.”161
In contrast, other interviewees opined that women brought different
stakeholders to the table because they were more likely to have had experience
representing or working for such a stakeholder.  One female board member
stated:
What does resonate is that because of the diversity of experience that
some women bring, because they bring a different experience because
they’re women, there’s maybe more sense to do different stakeholders
because they have experience of dealing with government, like in my
case, or more experience in dealing with different types of organizations. 
If you know about how different parts of society work, you see more
opportunities to respond to stakeholder concerns.162
When asked explicitly whether boards with more women would be less likely
to fire workers, or whether workers would receive more favorable treatment in
a post-quota France, board members expressed skepticism.  One female board
member was particularly hostile to the idea, stating:  “Neither in my experience
to date nor on the board have I seen that women are less likely to fire
people—you know nobody is going to fire people for the fun of it.”163
Another female board member acknowledged pro-labor decision-making by
boards in general, but attributed it to French culture and not to the addition of
women on boards:  
In France you have large businesses, even if they fire people, they give
them very important social advantages, very high unemployment
benefits, we give them plenty of time to find a job, etc.  We pay
attention.  Banks that have announced layoffs, they will do so abroad,
but they will not do it in France because they know that France is so
complicated . . . .  I think it is rather the culture of the company and
therefore the board is part of this culture, rather than the fact that women
say “No, no, no, we should not fire people” and men say “Yes, yes, yes,
we must fire them.”164
In sum, board members were very reluctant to admit that sex qua sex had had
any effect on corporate governance post-quota.  Participants acknowledged that
there were post-quota differences in risk aversion and sensitivity to stakeholders,
but attributed these differences to other causes.  The only substantive difference
that members acknowledged had to do with women members’ willingness to
160. Interview with 30F. 
161. Interview with 28M. 
162. Interview with 30F. 
163. Id.
164. Interview with 18F. 
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adopt family or women-friendly policies.  This combination of defensiveness on
substance and concessions on stereotypically “feminine” policies raises the
concern with reliability noted above; as insiders, board members may be too
deeply invested to report objectively and lack the capacity to identify when sex
actually makes a difference to corporate decision-making. 
V.  THE QUOTA AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECRUIT OUTSIDERS
In perhaps the most important insight drawn from the interviews, participants
acknowledged that the quota might change the board’s substantive decision-
making, but not because the new members were women.  Rather, members traced
substantive differences to the fact that newly added women were outsiders with
new and different perspectives:  that is, newly added women were more likely to
be junior, less likely to come from the Grandes Ecoles elite networks, more
likely to be foreign, and more likely to have extensive experience in non-
traditional areas like labor or the environment.  
A.  General Value of Outsiders
When asked about the real value of the quota, many members suggested that
what was important was less the sex of the added members and more their
newcomer status.  As one male participant stated, “It is certain that the arrival of
a new person on the board has an effect on the board, whether it is a man or a
woman and this effect is more or less important according to the personality of
the person in question.”165  A female board member said, “Afterwards, there was
a great effect:  having someone new.  It's always something that makes the effect
because suddenly we see with someone you do not know since forever who will
always re-present new issues but I think it is true whether it is a man or a
woman.”166 
When pressed to articulate why having new members affected the board,
some board members suggested that independent decision-making (in contrast to
the deference characteristic of French boards) was more likely with newcomers: 
So with independent board members, there’s their independence and so
there’s more change than to have a board member, I’d say, [of] current
stereotype.  And so someone who knows [Company X] for a long time,
who is from the same background, or a woman from an international
background who is much younger, for example, there you go, it would
make more novelty.167
Interestingly, members acknowledged that bringing in outsiders created
challenges for collective decision-making.  One female board member participant
argued that, particularly for smaller firms outside the CAC-40, adding new
165. Interview with 15F. 
166. Interview with 4F. 
167. Interview with 17F; see also Interview with 11M.  
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members might weaken the board:  “If you take out half [the board] and put
women in their place, well that’s going to destroy the dynamic that was slowly
going into place and as if the board served for something and then it serves for
nothing.”168  She also noted that a weaker board would be less able to stand up
to executive management.169
A few board member participants connected the outsider status of newly
added female members to some of the process differences articulated elsewhere. 
In their view, because women were the newcomers, they were more “prepared”
for meetings than men were, as well as “harder working.”170  Said one participant,
“[W]omen have the reputation of arriving with their materials well-prepared . .
. to show they are up to it.”171  Indeed, other members reframed the notion that
there was a link between sex and risk aversion:  one member suggested that risk-
aversion might be connected not to sex but to being new.172  
B.  New Areas of Substantive Expertise
Drawing on diversity research on the diversification of mental models and
heuristics, participants discussed the general benefit of bringing in women with
a broader range of experience than that possessed by the CEO-model of board
recruitment.  One female participant noted the horizon-broadening effect of the
quota in this way:  
[A]s there is no woman who is now president or CEO of CAC-40
companies, by definition, it is necessary to widen the circle.  It is by
definition.  Anyway, I think the same way that we force ourselves to
expand the circle because now we have an obligation to put women on
in the same way, it will break the habit of going to find someone among
the eighty people I described or perhaps 120.  And that, when we have
broken the habit to pick people like you at this time, we will look for
other people including men who have much more original horizons, less
business perhaps more research-oriented, etc.173
Members also appeared to recognize that change could be accelerated both
in terms of who left the board as well as who was added.  As one male board
member said: 
It is with the choice that they are going to make of who stays.  The game
is not in who they recruit in itself.  Because if we will look for women
who are conformist copies of the men we removed, we will have exactly
the same team.  We will replace defenders with younger defenders, but
168. Interview with 15F.  
169. Id.   
170. Interview with 20F. 
171. Interview with 21F.  
172. Interview with 15F.  
173. Interview with 19F.   
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still defenders, that changes nothing.174
This member went on to say that the choices before the board included expanding
the board’s profile by including a foreigner, “or someone with a sociological
sensibility, or an eminent ecologist.”175 
Members suggested in particular that boards explicitly recognized the value
of non-traditional substantive expertise.  Many members suggested that firms
have used a “two birds with one stone” kind of opportunistic reasoning.  For
example, a union representative on one board observed that when boards were
looking for women to comply with the quota, they used the opportunity to find
particular substantive expertise:176  
Intellectually and professionally, in competence and even in terms of
their preoccupations, I don’t see any reasons except if when we search
for women [board members] we search for women with particular
interests [such as the environment], and then we would skew the
statistics and say, you see, women brought this environmental
perspective.177
C.  Outside the Grandes Ecoles Networks
Consistent with Page’s arguments about mental models, participants
routinely noted the likelihood that newly added members would come from
outside the Grandes Ecoles networks.  Participants noted that in France’s highly
traditional corporate culture, a caste of bourgeois men exercise control over a
“Franco-Français” network of cross-managed firms that involves mutual stake
holding and/or board representation by leading firms in each other.178  According
to the members, a Grandes Ecoles network, particularly the Ecole Polytechnique,
predominates among the men running these firms.  As these boards select new
members, the alumnae of the Grandes Ecoles have traditionally been the most
sought-after potential members of boards, in part because they share the same
worldview and approach as the men who currently serve on the board.179 
As one female board member stated, the sheer number of the women needed
174. Interview with 5M. 
175. Id.
176. French law requires some worker representation on large firm boards. AFEP & MEDEF,
5ÉME RAPPORT ANNUEL SUR LE CODE AFEP-MEDEF DE 2013 [5th Annual Report on the AFEP-
MEDEF, 2013] (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.afep.com/uploads/medias/documents/5e_
rapport_application_du_Code_de_gouvernement_entreprise_Afep_Medef_Octobre_2013.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/A974-EXFQ.
177. Interview with 5M.  
178. Interview with 19F.  
179. François-Xavier Dudouet and Hervé Joly, Les Dirigeants Français du CAC 40:  Entre
Élitisme Scolaire et Passage par l’État [The Leaders of the French CAC 40:  Between Academic
Elitism and Run by the State], 2(21) SOCIOLOGIES PRATIQUES 35-47 (2010); see also Interview with
13F. 
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to fill the board slots will force the boards to get out of the very limited Grandes
Ecoles pool.180  Another female board member put it:  “the stock of people is
quite limited if compared with the stock of male persons.”181  Accordingly, board
members noted that “by the sole game of numbers, by the number of women that
must be found for the board terms, we will even so leave a bit the beaten path,
énarques, etc.”182
Recruiters confirmed the occurrence of this post-quota opportunistic
recruiting outside the social and professional networks of existing members:  
So that means that to look for these women, one must look in pools that
are not the habitual pools.  There you have it, so that means that they
will not be from the Grandes Ecoles, but that they will not have had
great leadership posts and they will have still some progression to make,
which does not mean that they will not have the skills to sit on a board,
but it will break, I think effectively, some modes of cooptation and
nothing but the fact that they have not be coopted in the same manner as
the men on boards, that will create another form of expression.183
Indeed, studies regarding the profile of female directors in France at the time
of the quota’s adoption show that female directors are generally younger than
their male colleagues (54.7 years old on average compared to 60.7 for men) and
more likely to have international origins.184  Although this profile is shifting as
many corporations take on new women directors, anecdotal evidence confirms
this shift.185  Many new female directors hold degrees in law or business
management in contrast to the more technical education received by their male
counterparts.  Male directors are most often graduates of the French Grandes
Ecoles.  Female directors also do not have the same experience at the top
executive levels as male directors.186  The feminization of boards of directors
may correlate with some diversification of skills and points of view on how to
run a business.187  As the next section notes, given the extraordinarily narrow
band of French society that has occupied corporate board positions,
180. Interview with 19F.  
181. Interview with 13F.  
182. Interview with 19F.  
183. Interview with 17F. 
184. L’OBSERVATOIRE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIÉTALE DES ENTREPRISES & L’INSTITUT
FRANÇAIS DES ADMINISTRATEURS, L’ACCÈS ET LA REPRÉSENTATIVITÉ DES FEMMES AUX ORGANES
DE GOUVERNANCE D’ENTREPRISE (2009).
185. Valérie Lion, Conseils d’Administration: ces Femmes Qui Cumulent [Boards of
Directors:  Women Who Combine], L’EXPRESS, 74 n.16 (May 2012).  
186. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 71, at 294.  
187. A counterargument may assert that less executive experience may not constitute useful
diverse experience.  Indeed, Amy Dittmar’s work on the lower experience among women on boards
in Norway after their adoption of a corporate board quota correlates this with lower returns on
equity.  See Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 71.  
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diversification may also bring global market knowledge.188
D.  Outside of France:  Foreign Perspectives
Many interviewees noted that firms turned to foreign women to fill the quota,
in part because firms saw foreign women as more experienced (generally and
with regard to international transactions) than their French counterparts.  One
male board member explained:  
[A]s I said, the French reservoir or pool is quite poor and limited, as by
the way French companies are more international, etc.  So, it’s evidence
that there’s a need, it’s clear, it’s very healthy to bring in profiles of non-
French people, it enlarges the . . . it’s very simple, it enlarges the pool
and it’s true that there could be interesting profiles in other countries.189
All participants who were chairs of their boards referenced the likelihood
that at least some of the new board members (all of whom obviously would be
female) would come from abroad.190  One recruiter confirmed this, saying, “All
the big bosses of the CAC-40 tell you, above all give me foreigners.”191  Many
members viewed the possibility of hiring foreign women as an opportunity: 
several participants referenced this as d’une pierre deux coups, in English, killing
two birds with one stone.192 
In the members’ view, two factors seemed to be driving this perception. 
First, for French firms with extensive foreign revenue (either established or in
development), recruiting board members from these markets would potentially
aid in globalizing these firms, reflecting the rapid globalization of capital markets
and the extensive foreign investment in France.193  As one member put it:  
When you're a group that operates internationally with strong growth in
emerging countries, it seems quite normal to have a board member who
knows these issues, who is capable to come to the board with
information about those countries . . . in terms of risk analysis . . .
strategic directions, there you have it . . . . It is for that reason that, given
the phenomenon of current globalization, there would be more and more
foreign board members on boards.194
188. Global perspectives are likely quite promising in terms of generating productive diversity
of perspective, of the type discussed by Page.  See generally PAGE, supra note 96.  
189. Interview with 23M. 
190. Interview with 18F. 
191. Interview with 9F. 
192. Translated literally it would be “from one stone two blows.”
193. Interview with 1M.  In fact, foreign investors own three-fourths of the CAC-40
companies’ capital.  Anne-Marie Rocco, Loi Zimmerman:  Encore un Effort d'Imagination!
[Zimmerman Law: Another Stretch of the Imagination!], FEMMES (May 17, 2013),
http://femmes.blogs.challenges.fr/archive/2013/05/17/loi-zimmermann-encore-un-effort-d-
imagination.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5VPB-MKK2.  
194. Interview with 17F. 
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Second, participants pointed out that French corporations would prefer non-
French executives to French women without executive experience.195  As one
female board member stated:
When you speak to headhunters who work today on filling board
positions for women, they say to you that all the companies have the
same robot portrait, that is to say, a woman, preferably foreign—because
that way you kill two birds with one stone:  you put at once sex and
foreign—who is “head of business unit,” “chief executive,” or
“chairman.”196
In addition, participants suggested that foreign women are favored because
they are able to escape the social hierarchy that places the Grandes Ecoles at the
pinnacle.  As one foreign female board member stated:  “so if you are not from
these Grandes Ecoles and you are French, it will be a bit biased [against you]. 
But for me I am a foreigner, so . . . I am free of this dichotomy:  those who
belong and those who do not.”197  The presence of foreign women does not
undermine the French social hierarchy as the presence of non-elite French
women would.
Empirical research in 2014 on the French quota by management scholars
Allemand and Brullebaut confirms a preference for foreign women:  in the 112
Parisian firms under study, administrators selected women for the quota who
were more frequently foreigners, from outside the company and from a legal
background, despite the fact that selection criteria did not specify any of these as
requirements.198  Likewise, the Fédération des Femmes Administrateurs
confirmed a stronger presence of foreign women on CAC-40 boards, although
both French and foreign women had elite educational profiles.199
195. Interestingly, one recruiter with whom we met laid out which nationalities were more
compatible with French boards.  
196. Interview with 19F. 
197. Interview with 13F. 
198. Isabelle Allemand & Bénédicte Brullebaut, Le Capital Humain des Femmes Récemment
Nommées dans les Conseils d’Administration des Sociétés Françaises Cotées à Paris [Human
Capital of Recently Appointed Women Within Listed Companies’ Boards in Paris], 18(3)
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 20-31 (2014).  A newsletter published in 2014 by L’Association
des Femmes Diplomees d’Expertise Compatable Administrateurs (“AFECA”) stated that the
diversity of women on boards is still low and the women who are selected are among top executives
and finance profiles.  The newsletter hypothesizes that internationalization could help leverage
boards’ efficiency because it would develop a strategy of growth on foreign markets, develop
cultural diversity within the boards, help spread best governance practices from all over the world,
and incentivize French women to apply to foreign boards.  La Place des Administratrices au Sein
des Sociétés Cotées Sur Euronext Paris au 30 Juin 2013 [The Role of Women Within Euronext
Listed Companies’ Boards as of June 30, 2013], Association des Femmes Diplômées d’Expertise
Comptable Administrateurs (“AFECA”), at 1-6 (2014).
199. Karima Bouaiss & Agnes Bricard, Les Femmes Administrateurs au Sein des Conseils
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Importantly, in the view of participants, the recruiting of foreign women
brings with it a different cultural set of norms.  As one member put it:  
Personally I am totally reticent with this discourse that women do
business differently from men.  Of course everyone does things
differently, because personalities are different, Americans do not do
business like the French. People from one company do not do business
like those from another.200
Members noted that boards recruiting foreign women had to think carefully about
the potential language barrier.  Several board members commented that their
boards function exclusively in French.201  Non-fluent members require
translation, which can both prove inadequate and cumbersome.202
Indeed, some board members suggested that non-French speaking women
would wield less power because of the language barrier:  as one male board
member said, “[t]hey will be weaker, and the reason I gave is the same for
men.”203  One participant, a female professional coach, went even further to
suggest that firms deliberately courted foreign women purposely to limit their
input:  
It’s also a way to keep the power and not be disturbed on strategic
aspects where these international women do not necessarily have the
expertise, the look, the knowledge related to the country.  Indeed, I think
it's a bit biased, so.  It is clear that this is a way to meet the law but at the
same time is a way to keep its small area without necessarily having
women who will come to disturb the strategy . . . 204
Others mentioned that cultural differences or national tensions (including historic
issues with Germany) might surface to prevent the integration of a foreign board
member.205
Participants were sensitive to the possibility that foreign women would be
treated as tokens, there to comply with the quota but not given real political
power.  One recruiter suggested that foreign women might not be sufficiently
attentive to the question of developing political power:  
I think there is a real issue and that is a problem for women is that they
d’Administration des Sociétés du SBF 120 en 2013 [Women directors on boards of companies in
the SBF120 in 2013], Fédération des Femmes Administrateurs (2014).
200. Interview with 23M. 
201. “On top of it, there’s a linguistic question.  The most widely spoken language is English. 
In French firms, there are not many where the most widely spoken language is English.  You are
obligated to translate everything in English and thus you have to have Francophone women.” 
Interview with 11M.  
202. Interview with 19F.  
203. Interview with 28M.  
204. Interview with 2F.  
205. Interview with 9F.  
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often do not pay enough attention to develop their political meaning. 
That's a lot of work being done with them at all levels and especially
when they arrive at the executive level, if they are to be on the board,
what is their network, what is their image, what is their reputation, what
is their appointment, they know how to interact in a way political
decision-making body.206
E.  More Junior Than the Old Boys’ Club:  Women and Seniority
Given the perceived lack of depth in the French pool of experienced women,
some members thought that recruiting would be more likely to bring in more
junior women. As one board chair stated:  
It is certain that it will change, but it’s because it’s . . . people with
different experiences, for example, effectively to arrive at forty percent
one will have to name women who are not sixty or sixty-five but who
will be forty-five . . . .  It will automatically renew the profiles, and we
will have younger people with different experiences.207
Board members also noted that male recruiting would be affected by the
quota:  boards would now be more selective in the men they chose to keep on the
board.208  In the view of one board member, this heightened selectivity for males
likely would eliminate more senior men, not by virtue of their age but because
their more dated market experience would quickly become obsolete in a fast-
evolving marketplace.209  Perhaps not coincidentally, this participant suggested
that those same senior men on the chopping block were more likely to also have
retrograde understandings of women and their ability to contribute to corporate
governance.210
F.  Plus Ça Change
Although many participants emphasized the diversity of newly added
women, other participants pointed out the way in which recruiting processes
continue to reproduce the perspectives of the men already serving on boards.  As
one senior female board member said:
[A]ll these [French] women have been made by the Grandes Ecoles of
engineers, such as I’X, Centrale, all that, or they did Sciences-Po, they
did the Ecole Nationale d’Administration, the grandes écoles of
commerce.  When you see the resumes . . . we are in a system of
Grandes Ecoles, with important backgrounds . . . .  That is not at all
diversified.  It’s for this that I say that the most important challenge for
206. Interview with 20F.  
207. Interview with 23M.  
208. Interview with 31M.  
209. Id.
210. Interview with 23M.  
2015] MORE THAN A WOMAN 927
French companies, it’s the internationalizations of their boards.211
Recruiter interviews went some way to explain this self-reproducing
dynamic:  headhunters reported that to increase their chances of success, they
choose people whose credentials look much like the current board members.212 
In line with recent research, these responses suggest that, adding women, without
other changes, will lead to decisions substantively similar to those by the board
prior to their joining.213  At the same time, participants thought that the use of
headhunters could institutionalize diversity as well, by shifting firms away from
the use of private networks and toward the use of market participants for finding
board members.214
In sum, board members suggested that the quota had in fact generated
significant substantive differences by adding women, but not because the newly
added members were women.  Rather, their difference in other regards—their
foreignness, their outsider status relative to the Grandes Ecoles networks, their
relative lack of experience and fresh perspective, and their expertise in areas not
traditionally represented on boards—contributed to a board’s ability to think
outside the box.
These board member observations are consistent with Page’s observations
that what matters about diversity are the alternative mental models, heuristics,
frameworks, and perspectives that newly added members bring to collective
decision-making.215  Particularly with regard to additional areas of expertise,
newly added female members who see board issues from a more sociological
perspective, or ecological perspective, or with greater sensitivity to stakeholders
than shareholders, might potentially shake up (and thereby improve) traditional
models by cross-fertilizing them with other perspectives.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This preliminary qualitative study was designed to explore the link between
sex and corporate governance and performance, from the perspective of those
who currently sit on the boards of France’s leading companies.  Our results lead
to a number of preliminary conclusions. First, in the board members’ view, sex
affirmatively affects the process of board decision-making, confirming earlier
research.  Women board members participate differently as board members than
do men.  In particular, participants observed that women asked more “naïve”
questions, asked them more methodically, and asked the questions that men
refrained from asking for fear of appearing foolish.  Members noted that this
style of questioning might well have been a function of the fact that newly added
female members had less experience and were thus in need of additional
211. Interview with 7F. 
212. Interview with 9F.  
213. Magnier & Rosenblum, supra note 28; Darren Rosenblum, Sex Regimes and the
Reproduction of Corporate Elites (forthcoming) (on file with author).  
214. Interview with 15F.  
215. See generally PAGE, supra note 96.
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information.
The presence of women board members also appeared to reduce the
combative tone of some board discussions, in the view of the board members
themselves.  Conversations were less power-driven and more open-ended;
gallantry and civility were more prevalent.
Board members suggested, however, that increasing the number of women
on the board did not affect substantive decision-making by boards.  Even after
being prompted by the interviewer, participants resisted the findings from earlier
research that sex affected the board’s substantive decision.  More specifically,
they rejected the idea that, as had been reported in a post-quota Norwegian study,
women on boards had reduced the number of workforce layoffs because they
were empathetic to labor.  Participants did find women to be more empathetic to
stakeholder interests, though they qualified this finding by attributing it to a more
general corporate trend.  Participants also suggested that post-quota boards might
prove more likely to adopt policies that were pro-family, that promoted corporate
social responsibility, and that aggressively recruited and hired women into
positions of power and responsibility within the firm.
In our most important finding, board members suggested that any post-quota
substantive differences could be attributed to the outsider status of newly added
female members.  Participants reported that such women were more likely to be
foreign (because firms valued their experience and foreign connections), junior
(because of the history of discrimination and the paucity of women with high
level executive experience), and less likely to come from the Grandes Ecoles
exclusive network.  Moreover, according to the participants, firms were more
likely to use the occasion of the quota as an opportunity to bring in women with
additional areas of expertise—national, environmental, ecological, sociological,
labor, etc.  These findings suggest that such “two birds with one stone”
opportunities to diversify might happen only during the accelerated window of
adding members that the quota occasions.
Dhir’s work on Norway’s quota, which also draws from qualitative
interviews of board members, provides support for these findings, though his
study reaches a slightly different conclusion.  Dhir’s board member subjects
reported that women participants affected the process of board decision making
in much the same way that our participants reported—increasing the number of
questions asked, expanding the range of perspectives as outsiders, and making
process more systematic and orderly.  In contrast to our participants, Dhir’s
subjects reported that these results were intimately connected to the sex of the
newcomers, and not just their outsider or newcomer status, where our subjects
reported these results as traceable to outsider or newcomer status rather than their
sex.  
Three factors may help to explain Dhir’s subjects’ responses.  First, in
contrast to Dhir, our study asked participants to differentiate between process and
substance, in light of existing research that suggests gender might make a
difference on the former without affecting the latter. Our interviews also pressed
participants more aggressively to differentiate between outsider status and gender
qua gender as the source of any potential effect on corporate decision-making. 
In our study, it was the “effect on substance” questions that occasioned French
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participants’ reflections on the difference between sex as sex and sex as a marker
for a wide range of outsider or newcomer attributes.  
Second, Dhir’s subjects appeared more willing to attribute these differences
to sex than to non-sex factors like outsider or newcomer status.  It may well be
that Dhir’s participants may have been essentializing attributes not intrinsically
connected to sex, as Dhir himself acknowledges, though he ultimately rejects this
possibility.  When pressed, Dhir’s participants had difficulty tracing differences
in process to something other than newcomer or outsider status. Instead,
participants used phrases like “female perspectives” and indirect references to
outsider men still being men even if they were trained in other disciplines.  In one
instance, participants did speak of the “relational” perspective that women
brought to the table, an idea that finds support in existing research. But by and
large, participants referred more to outsider and newcomer traits when asked to
explain why women affected decision-making.  
Third, economic and cultural factors may distinguish the Norwegian
corporate context from the French one.  As Dhir noted, and as Darren Rosenblum
has described previously in Feminizing Capital,216 Norway is a country where sex
equality abounds.  The quota’s adoption was to remedy the fact that other aspects
of society had far higher indices of equality than the corporate sector.  In this
regard, the Norwegian context differs markedly from the French one, in which
sex equality indices lag substantially behind those of Norway.  Such differences
may account for Norwegian participants’ willingness to attribute to gender what
French participants attribute to outsider or newcomer status.  Economic
distinctions merit attention as well, as they too may have consequences for our
distinct outcomes.  Norway is a very wealthy but small country—its economy
does not have the wide corporate diversity of larger economies.  France is the
world’s fifth largest economy and its corporate sector is quite broad and
increasingly (as we argue) globalized.217  
In any event, it is not possible to yet discern from Dhir’s results, nor from
ours for that matter, whether any of the differences participants report are
traceable to sex qua sex, to outsider status, or to some combination.218  As we
216. Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital:  A Corporate Imperitive, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.
J. 55 (2009).
217. Recent market capitalizations reflect this difference:  Norway’s publicly traded shares
float for $250B, while France’s are valued at $1.8T.  The CAC 40 alone comprises $1.3T. 
Norway’s exceptional levels of both gender equality and wealth may accord its firms an equally
exceptional range of legitimate market behaviors.  The size and vulnerability to market forces of
France’s firms may more closely approximate the market pressures that face firms across the
Atlantic.  In addition, board members in France are limited to serving on four boards, whereas
Norway does not limit board participation, a factor that may have led Norwegian companies to limit
their searches to women who already had board positions because they could do so.
218. It is also worth noting that our pools differ.  Dhir’s subject population included fifteen
women and eight men, and that representation of women in his study may lead to a distinct result.
Our study comes closer to parity, although even parity would constitute an overrepresentation of
women given that women are still underrepresented on boards.
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conclude, further research is necessary to rigorously disentangle these factors
more fully.
Indeed, our preliminary analysis generates a number of potentially testable
hypotheses for future research:  collective decision-making on corporate boards
will be substantively improved by the addition of (i) foreign members; (ii)
members with non-traditional areas of expertise like labor or the environment;
(iii) members with less experience; (iv) members outside the traditional
credentialing networks like the Grandes Ecoles.  More generally, scholars should
conduct research to determine whether sex quotas (or any other kind of quota)
might produce improvements in substantive decision-making less because of
some identity-based perspective that is biologically or socially based, and more
because the structural differences that accompany recruiting a different group of
people will inevitably diversify the mental models and perspectives of decision-
makers at the table.  Future research will also, inevitably, have to grapple with
the friction in-group dynamics introduced by such differences.  As quotas spread
and become more legitimate components of corporate governance, the
implementation experiences and data will provide fruitful avenues for additional
research.
